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Cognitive Styles in the Use of 
Spatial Direction Terms
W i l l e m  J. M. L e v e l t
Let us, by way of introduction, consider two spatial descriptions obtained in 
an experiment to be described more fully below. The two descriptions are of 
the same spatial pattern, namely the one presented in Figure 1, but were given 
by two different subjects. One subject was a male student, while the other was 
a female housekeeper. Subsequently, they will be referred to as ‘he’ and 
‘she’.
The subjects had been instructed to describe the pattern in such a way that 
a listener familiar with the type of patterns involved would be able to redraw 
the pattern accurately from a tape recording made of their speech. The 
instructions moreover asked the subjects to start the description at the node 
marked by an arrow.
Figure  1 N e tw o r k  of  c o lo u red  n o d e s  an d  b lack  arcs,  p r e s e n te d  to 
sub jec ts  to descr ibe .  T h e  a r ro w  ind ica tes  w h e re  the  descr ip t ion
sh o u ld  begin
His description  :
0. In het middel beginnen, een grijs knooppunt 
In the m iddle to begin , a grey nodal poin t
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1. Vandaaruit naar boven, een rood knooppunt 
From there upwards , a red nodal poin t
2. Dan naar links toe, een roze knooppunt vanuit rood 
Then to the left, a p ink nodal po in t from  red
3. Dan vanuit roze weer naar links toe een blauw knooppunt 
Then from  p in k  again to the left a blue nodal poin t
4. Dan weer terug naar rood 
Then back again to red
5. Dan van rood naar rechts toe een geel knooppunt 
Then from  red to the right a yellow  nodal poin t
6. En vanuit geel weer naar rechts toe een groen knooppunt 
A n d  from  yellow  again to the right a green nodal po in t
Her description:
0. Ik start bij kruispunt grijs
I start at crossing po in t grey
1. Ga rechtdoor naar rood 
G o straight on to red
2. Ga linksaf naar roze 
G o left to p ink
3. Ga rechtdoor naar blauw 
G o straight on to blue
4. Draai rond ga terug naar roze 
Turn around go back to p ink
5. Ga terug, eh rech tdoor naar rood 
G o back , uh straight on to red
6. R echtdoor naar  geel 
Straight on to yellow
7. R echtdoor naar  groen 
Straight on to green
Both descriptions are tours of some sort. Each tour starts at the grey node 
indicated by the arrow (line 0 in the descriptions), and ends at the green one, 
meanwhile traversing all the nodes in a more or less connected way. The 
tours, moreover, consist of e lem entary  m oves  (lines 1 -7  in the descriptions) 
consisting of an optional source phrase (e.g. ‘from th e re ’; ‘from p ink’), a 
directional phrase ( ‘to the left’, ‘back again’, ‘straight o n ’, etc.), and a goal 
phrase ( ‘a blue nodal po in t’, ‘to red ’, etc.). But within this ra ther  fixed frame, 
the two descriptions exhibit some striking differences. The m aker  of the tour 
is unspecified in his description, but ‘I ’ in hers (although this is dele ted  in all 
moves subsequent to the first one, so that the moves also sound like instruc­
tions for the addressee). H e usually gives the source phrase at each move, but 
she doesn’t. H e r  description is also more elliptical in that, except for line 0,
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the nodes are referred to by their colour only (e.g. ‘blue’), whereas he often 
uses a full noun phrase (‘a blue nodal point’). In the one case where they both 
use the colour term adjectivally, namely in line 0, there is still a marked 
difference: he uses the indefinite article, and normal Dutch word order ( ‘een 
grijs knooppunt’), whereas she omits the article and uses inverse order 
( ‘kruispunt grijs’), as if to accentuate the given/new structure.
In the following we will not deal with all these differences or many others 
that could be detected. Instead, we will limit ourselves to a discussion of some 
differences in the use of directional expressions, such as ‘left’, ‘right’, and 
‘straight o n ’, and in the way such expressions are strung together. O ur aim is 
to show that such individual differences are not more or less random fluctu­
ations in idiolect, but are due to systematic variations in the ways people 
operate  on internal representations of space.
In order  to focus on the phenom ena we have in mind, compare the following 
differences between the two descriptions:
(i) In his move 1 the directional term is ‘upwards’ (‘naar boven’); the 
corresponding term in her move 1 is ‘straight o n ’ (‘rechtdoor’).
(ii) Moving from pink to blue is described by him as ‘again to the left’ 
( ‘weer naar links’) in move 3, whereas for the same move she uses ‘straight 
o n ’ (‘rech tdoor’).
(iii) His move 4 brings him back to the red crossing point in one leap, 
unspecified as to direction (‘back again’), whereas she uses two specified 
moves to accomplish this: her move 4 which describes the turning around and 
return to pink (this node is not m entioned again by him at all); and her move 
5 for reaching the red crossing node, which starts out with ‘go back’, but then 
is corrected to the more specific ‘straight o n ’.
(iv) In order to move from red to yellow he uses as directional phrase ‘to 
the right’ ( ‘naar rechts to e ’) in his move 5, whereas she accomplishes this in 
her move 6 with ‘straight o n ’ ( ‘rech tdoor’).
(v) Finally, the concluding move to green is specified by him (move 6) as 
‘again to the right’ ( ‘weer naar rechts to e ’), whereas she indicates it (move 7) 
as ‘straight on ’ (‘rech tdoor’).
O ne might want to ascribe the differences (i) and (iii) to superficial vari­
ation in wording: ‘upw ards’ and ‘straight o n ’ in (i) are synonymous in the con­
text of use; each subject could have used the o ther  term without much 
consequence for the listener. Similarly for (iii), the combination of ‘go back’ 
and ‘straight o n ’ in her description may just be a bit more specific than his 
‘back again’, but still they would be largely synonymous in the given context. 
However, such an explanation cannot hold for differences (ii), (iv), and (v), 
where e ither ‘right’ or ‘left’ in his description corresponds to ‘straight o n ’ in 
her description. These expressions are neither synonymous nor differ in
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degree of specificity, and one should worry for the subjects who have to draw 
the pattern on the basis of these descriptions.
There are two different, but related factors which can account for the 
observed discrepancies. The first factor I will call ‘linearization type’, and the 
second factor I will denote by ‘orientation type’. These are to be considered 
as cognitive style factors in dealing with space. Let us consider them in turn.
1 L IN E A R IZ A T IO N  TY PES
In order to describe a spatial pattern like that in Figure 1, one needs to map a 
non-linear spatial configuration onto a linear sequence of verbal expressions, 
or statements. This should be done in such a way that a listener can draw the 
pattern given the description and acquaintance with the class of actual 
patterns. In this particular setting, therefore, the description should, together 
with the foreknowledge of the listener, uniquely specify the pattern. Let us 
call this task requirement ‘completeness’.
The speaker may approach this requirem ent of completeness in several 
ways. One way to form a complete linearization would be to give a global 
structural description, and then provide the details of increasingly smaller 
parts. That is, one could start out by saying ‘This pattern is T -shaped’, and 
then continue by mentioning the nodes on the vertical bar, and from left to 
right those on the horizontal bar. O f the 53 adult subjects who participated in 
our experiment, and described the pattern shown in Figure 1, only one started 
out like this (‘On this figure I see a vertical and a horizontal line. On the 
vertical line the first one is a grey d o t’, etc.). In all o ther cases the linearization 
strategy was to make a tou r , as in the two examples given above. The 
dominance of tour-like linearizations in spatial descriptions has been 
observed in earlier studies as well: in Linde & L abov’s (1975) seminal paper 
on apartm ent descriptions, in Klein’s (1979, also this volume), Wunderlich & 
Reinelt’s (this volume), and M unro’s (1977) studies of route directions, and 
in U llm er-Ehrich’s (1979 and this volume) study of room descriptions. 
Although there are marked differences between these studies with respect to 
the character of such tours (in room descriptions, for instance, only a ‘gaze 
to u r’ is made, contrary to the o ther cases), the tour strategy for dealing with 
linearization of spatial structures seems to be a fairly general one.
W hat is less apparent, however, is that there are systematic individual 
differences in the way  tours are constructed. In an earlier paper  (Levelt, 
1981) I have shown that the 53 subjects from the present experim ent quite 
neatly divide into two main linearization types, the so-called ‘ju m p ers ’ and 
‘m overs’. The essential difference between them lies in the way they deal with 
backtracking to choice points. Jum pers deal with choice points in the pattern  
in the following way: they first select one branch and describe it entirely;
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they then leap back to the choice point in order to describe the (or an-) 
o ther branch. Movers do not leap back, but m ove  step by step back, along 
the branch already described, until they again reach the choice point. The 
male subject above is a jum per (see move 4), whereas the female subject is 
a mover (see moves 4 and 5). These types are quite consistent. The subjects 
in the present experiment not only described Figure 1, but 53 different 
patterns in total. O f these patterns, 45 involved choice points, and it almost 
always turned out that if a subject was a jum per in the description of one 
pattern , he was a jum per for all the others too, and also once a mover, always 
a mover. O f our 53 subjects, only four jum ped in some patterns and moved in 
others, but even these had a strong preference for either moving or jumping. 
A m ong the 49 ‘pu re ’ types, there were just about twice as many jum pers (33) 
as movers (16).
From the findings in that study we have reason to believe that jum pers and 
movers differ in the way they cope with their own memory requirements in 
producing a description. Both jum pers and movers keep a record of the nodes 
and branches they have already mentioned. But it seems that, over and above 
this, jum pers  mark for themselves the choice node(s) they will have to return 
to after finishing the description of one branch. This is not a wholly trivial 
matter, since the branch being described may contain a choice point of its 
own. An example is given in Figure 2. If a jum per  starts moving through
Figure 2 Network of coloured nodes and black arcs with an 
‘em bedded’ choice node. (Numbers are presented only for ease of
reference in the text)
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Figure 2 in the succession 1 —» 2 —> 3 —» 4, he has not only the first choice 
node 2 to return to (for finishing 2 —» 6 —» 7 —» 8), but also the later choice 
point 3. This return is necessary in order to describe the alternative branch 
that leads from node 3 to node 5. If a jum per marks for himself the nodes to 
which he has to return, he must also impose some order on them. After 
reaching node 4 in Figure 2, which of the two return addresses will get 
priority? If it is the first choice node encountered (2), the jum per will describe 
branch 6 —3► 7 —» 8 first, but if it is the last choice node (i.e. node 3), then 
priority will be given to description of the branch to 5. If no specific order is 
imposed there will be within- and between-subject differences in order  of 
return. What we predicted and found in the earlier study was that jum pers 
return to choice nodes in reverse order. In Figure 2, for instance, they return 
to node 3 for completing the description of 3 —> 5 before returning to 2 for 
the description of branch 2 —» 6 —> 7 —> 8. The prediction was based on an 
Augm ented Transition Network (A TN) model which contains a push-down 
store for choice node addresses, and thus has the required first-in-last-out 
characteristic. For a large variety of complex patterns, jum pers almost 
without exception adhered to this reverse order of return to unfinished choice 
nodes. This is in agreem ent with what Linde & Labov (1975) found in their 
study of apartm ent descriptions. Still, the situations were quite different: in 
their study, subjects described from memory, whereas in our study they 
described a perceptually available pattern.
Movers, we supposed, can make their descriptions without explicit book­
keeping of unfinished choice nodes. They can produce a complete linear­
ization by working from their record of nodes and branches described. The 
return move at the end of each branch guarantees that the unfinished choice 
point will be found again, and even that this will be the last unfinished choice 
node. The mover who runs through Figure 2 in the o rder  1 —» 2 3 —» 4 
must return to node 3 before returning to 2. The mover describes the pattern  
‘without lifting the pencil’, so to speak. Clearly, such a description is less 
efficient than a ju m p e r’s description, since the nodes along the return  path are 
mentioned twice. On the o ther  hand, it may be an easier description for the 
listener to follow, and in any case involves less book-keeping for the speaker 
since no recording of return  addresses is required. The earlier paper gives an 
ATN model describing this mover-behaviour. It contains no special push­
down stack for choice nodes, but keeps only a record of completed nodes and 
branches. What the mover does, according to this model, is re turn  at the end 
of a branch, and check his records for each node on his return path. Any arc 
that has not yet been described will be entered. It seems to be somewhat 
expensive to check each node and arc described before, but in a perceptual 
situation this involves very little effort: the visually present nodes and arcs 
are, one after another, retrieval cues for the records; there is no special
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memory load involved. It should be noticed that this would be quite different 
if a subject has to work from memory as in the apartment descriptions. A 
mover would then have to retrieve each node’s records by means of a retrieval 
cue which is itself a trace in memory, namely the earlier node or arc. This, 
of course, is harder than perceptually guided retrieval. It is not surprising that 
there are no movers in the Linde and Labov study, where subjects have to 
describe from memory. Almost all subjects there are jumpers.
If these hypothetical differences in cognitive style between jum pers and 
movers are essentially true, one might predict that jumpers would try to 
linearize a pattern in such a way as to minimize their memory load, or more 
precisely the stack of return  addresses they have to keep in mind. In describ­
ing the pattern in Figure 2, for instance, jum pers should show a preference for 
going to the left first at choice point 2. In that case, they have to store only 
one choice point while describing 6 —» 7 —» 8. Jumping back to 2, this can now 
be removed from their memory stack. Arriving at 3 on the following move, 
this choice point will now be stored, so that again a memory load of just one 
element results. If, however, a jum per goes to the right first on reaching point
2, he must store that choice point, and later, on top of that, choice point 3. 
That would result in a memory load of two elements. So, jum pers should 
prefer to go left first at choice point 2, in order to minimize memory load.
Movers, on the o ther hand, might try to minimize the am ount of back­
tracking they have to do. If they go right first at choice point 2 they will have 
to make three return moves, namely 4 —» 3, 5 —» 3, and 3 —» 2. But if they go 
left first they must make four return moves: 8 ^ 7 ,  7 6, 6 —»2  and 4 —> 3 
(or 5 ^ 3  dependent on the direction they take first at 3). It is thus more 
efficient for them to turn right first at 2; this is just the opposite of what the 
jum pers  are predicted to do. The experiment gave clear support for these 
different strategies. O f our 33 jum pers 26 went left first in Figure 2, and only 
seven went right first. O f the 16 movers, however, only four went left first, the 
others started going right at choice node 2. Similar results were obtained for 
o ther  patterns.
So much for linearization types. The distinction between jum pers and 
movers explains one difference between the two descriptions we started out 
with. U n der  (iii) we mentioned his coming back from blue to the red crossing 
point in one unspecific move ( ‘then back again to red ’), whereas she used two 
more specified moves to accomplish this (‘Turn around go back to p ink’ and 
‘Go back, uh straight on to re d ’). This difference is not due to a global 
tendency on her part to be a bit more specific in her description (in fact, she 
isn’t, leaving out almost all of the source phrases), but to a well-defined 
difference in linearization strategy. As we will see in Section 3, difference (iv) 
is probably also due to linearization type. That analysis, however, requires 
some insight in the o ther  style factor, orientation type.
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2 O R IE N T A T IO N  TY PES
The discussion of orientation types can be best introduced by a quotation 
from Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976, p. 396):
‘We will call the linguistic system for talking about space relative to a speaker’s 
egocentric origin and coordinate axes the deictic system. We will contrast the 
deictic system with the intrinsic system, where spatial terms are interpreted rela­
tive to coordinate axes derived from intrinsic parts of the referent itself. Another 
way to phrase this distinction is to say that in the deictic system spatial terms are 
interpreted relative to intrinsic parts of ego, whereas in the intrinsic system they 
are interpreted relative to intrinsic parts of something else.’
This distinction is directly applicable to the present case. The subject in our 
experiment was always provided with a customary physical position with 
respect to a pattern. The patterns of Figures 1 and 2 were placed on a table 
before the subject in the position they would be if the present seated reader 
put the book down flat in front of him, oriented for easy reading. Now, 
consider Figure 1, and let us assume that the last move that was made by the 
subject was from red to pink. There are, basically, two ways of describing the 
location of blue. If the deictic system is used, the subject will relate blue to 
pink by (tacit) reference to coordinates of ego, and select an expression such 
as ‘left from pink is b lue’. If the intrinsic system is used, reference will be 
taken from intrinsic parts of the pattern , here presumably the last path moved 
along in the tour (i.e. the path from red to pink). So, now the expression will 
be something like ‘straight on from pink is b lue’. Thus, it turns out that the 
same pathway can be denoted by ‘left’ or ‘straight’ depending on the coordi­
nate system used. Ideally, the speaker should inform the listener which of the 
two systems he has in mind. Miller & Johnson-Laird suggest that there might 
be a convention that the intrinsic system is used, unless the deictic system is 
explicitly introduced (‘from my point of view’), or unless the intrinsic system 
cannot be used (if the relatum has no intrinsic orientation). This ideal situa­
tion is not approached in the present experiment: we find that in roughly 
two-thirds of the cases where deictic and intrinsic use can be distinguished, 
the deictic system is used, and it is almost never the case that this use is 
explicitly m entioned to the listener.1 Still, the listener’s position is not hope­
less. There  is a combination of two factors which may help the listener find 
out which of the systems is in fact used.
The first factor is the use of specific directional terms. If the speaker in the 
setting of the present experim ent uses terms such as ‘above’, ‘u p ’, ‘un der’, 
‘below’, etc., i.e. terms related to a vertical dimension, the listener can safely 
conclude that the speaker is operating in the deictic system. This is not at all a 
trivial matter, and we will discuss it at length after some supporting data  have 
been presented. If the orientation system can be discovered, the listener must,
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moreover, be justified in assuming that it is used consistently . If the speaker 
switches perspective at every move within a pattern, the listener will be lost. 
But it would also be helpful to the listener if he could make the reasonable 
assumption that in the present task, where the speaker gives a sequence of 
pattern descriptions, consistency also exists across patterns. If the assumption 
is correct, one could speak of orientation types. Some subjects would be of 
the pattern-oriented  type, consistently using the intrinsic system; others would 
be of the ego-oriented  type, consistently using the deictic system.
There is evidence that these types exist. Let us first give some indication of 
within-pattern consistency. There are three moves in the description of the 
pattern in Figure 1, where an ego-oriented use of terms can differ from a 
pattern-oriented one. Firstly, going from pink to blue would be ‘left’ (or some 
synonym ‘left side’, ‘to the left’, etc.) for ego-oriented types and ‘straight’ (or 
some synonym) for the pattern-oriented types. Secondly, the move from yel­
low to green would, similarly, be ‘right’ for the ego-oriented types, and again 
‘straight’ for the pattern-oriented ones. Finally, the use of ‘u p ’ or some 
synonym would indicate deictic use, as m entioned earlier and to be discussed 
shortly; this may distinguish the ego-oriented type in describing the very first 
move, from grey to red.
Let us first compare the subjects’ behaviours in the first two cases. We 
categorized each term used in these two moves as pattern-oriented (‘straight 
o n ’, or its synonyms), or ego-oriented ( ‘left’, ‘right’, or synonyms). This could 
not always be done, for instance when a subject merely said ‘and then ’ or 
‘and’. For the fully categorizable cases, Table 1 gives the contingency distribu­
tion. It appears that there is only one inconsistent subject. This subject com­
bines ‘straight o n ’ ( ‘rech tdoor’) with ‘keep going left’ (‘links blijven gaan’), an 
expression which allows for both a durational and a repetitive interpretation, 
so that this inconsistency is at best a weak one. If we remove this subject from 
further consideration, 34 subjects can be categorized as explicitly ego- or 
pattern-oriented , 22 being ego-oriented, and 12 pattern-oriented. Let us see 
how these 34 behave at the first move, from grey to red. Will there be more 
‘ups’ and ‘aboves’ among the ego-oriented subjects? This can be seen in 
contingency Table 2. The table shows a highly significant interaction: with 
only two exceptions, the ego-oriented subjects use a vertical-dimensión term
Table 1 Ego- and pattern-oriented responses for two moves in Figure 1 (from pink
to blue, and from yellow to green)
Move from pink to blue
Move from yellow to green Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented
Ego-oriented 22 0
Pattern-oriented 1 12
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Table 2 Use of vertical dimension terms at first move (grey to red) in Figure 1
(‘up’, etc.) by ego- and pattern-oriented subjects
Vertical-dimensión Other term
Subjects term used used
Ego-oriented 20 2
Pattern-oriented 1 11
to describe the first move from grey to red, whereas only one of the pattern- 
oriented subjects does.
From all this it can be concluded that three of the differences which we 
observed at the beginning of this paper between our male and female sub­
jects’ descriptions are linked intimately together. Distinction (i) concerned 
the first move where he said ‘up’, and she ‘straight o n ’; distinction (ii) con­
cerned move 3 from pink to blue, where he used ‘again to the left’, and she 
‘straight on ';  and distinction (v) involved the last move, from yellow to green, 
where he used ‘again to the right’, and she ‘straight o n ’. All three differences 
can be explained by orientation type: he being ego-oriented (deictic), and she 
being pattern-oriented (intrinsic).
Still to be explained is why vertical-dimensión terms are consistently used 
in deictic orientation, and not in intrinsic orientation. There  are various pos­
sible accounts of this. One could argue that in deictic orientation the subject 
mentally rotates the page into vertical position (somewhat like holding a 
newspaper). This explanation would only shift the problem to the question as 
to why this mental rotation does not take place in intrinsic orientation. 
A no ther  account could be that in deictic orientation the direction ‘away from 
ego’ coincides with what is normally called ‘top of page’: the top /bottom  of 
page terminology would then be metaphorically extended to the use of ‘u p ’ 
and ‘dow n’; since the orientation of page to ego is irrelevant in the intrinsic 
system, the vertical m etaphors will only appear in the case of deictic o rien ta­
tion. This account is not convincing either, or at least it is not very elegant: 
why would somebody who prefers to operate  in ego-centric (deictic) orien ta­
tion resort to a m etaphor which is intrinsic; the top of a page is an intrinsic 
property of the page, defined by the conventional shape and way of printing. 
Moreover, there was no print on our patterns, and the sheets were exactly 
square.
We prefer a more literal account of the use of vertical-dimensión terms in 
deictic orientation. In the tour strategy the ego-centric orientation is mediated 
by m ovement of gaze. The subject’s tour is a gaze tour, and the directions of 
the gaze shifts correspond exactly to the directional terms used: in deictic 
orientation it is not only the case that ‘left’ and ‘right’ agree respectively with 
leftward and rightward shifts of gaze, but that ‘u p ’ and ‘dow n’ indeed conform
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to upward and downward gaze movements. In intrinsic orientation, the rela­
tions to ‘watching ego’ are irrelevant, and direction of gaze is irrelevant for 
the selection of directional terms. What matters there is the change or con­
tinuation of direction in the plane, whatever the gaze and orientation of the 
speaker— no vertical dimension is involved. This account would predict that 
for deictic subjects vertical dimension terms will diminish or disappear if the 
horizontal plane of the pattern is lifted to (almost) eye level: this will almost 
completely eliminate vertical eye movements.
Let us now consider whether these deictic versus intrinsic characteristics 
carry over to the descriptions of o ther patterns. Are orientation types consis­
tent across patterns? Here we will report some evidence in support of such 
consistency. R em em ber that we defined the orientation type of our 34 ‘clear 
cases’ by the terms they used for the two extreme moves in Figure 1: ‘left’ and 
‘right’ defined the ego-oriented subject, ‘straight o n ’ the pattern-oriented 
subject. We have claimed above that such differences in use of terms are not 
superficial variations in idiolect, but are due to underlying cognitive style 
factors. An idiolect explanation would be that some people just prefer using 
terms like ‘left’ and ‘right’, whereas others have a tendency to say ‘straight’ 
wherever they can. In order  to exclude the possibility of such an explanation, 
we have analysed the description of two o ther  patterns where a consistent 
ego-oriented subject should not use ‘left’ and ‘right’, and a consistent 
pattern-oriented  subject should not use ‘straight on’, but in fact ‘left’ and 
‘right’. These patterns are given in Figures 3 and 4. They are mirror images of 
one another, and essentially present the same problem. Let us, therefore,
Figure 3 Pattern with a loop. The 
description begins at the arrow
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Figure 4 A mirror image of the net­
work shown in Figure 3
discuss the case of Figure 3, the o ther one being the same, mutatis mutandis. 
The pattern  contains a loop, and usually subjects describe a loop by working 
all the way around it. In this case they either go from yellow to blue to orange 
to green, and back to yellow, or the o ther  way around. Let us assume a 
subject starts making the loop via blue. Irrespective of being ego- or pattern- 
oriented, the next move direction, to orange, will be described by a term like 
i e f t \  But now consider the following move from orange to green. This cannot 
be called ‘left’ if the subject is ego-oriented, since in that fram ework it is 
‘towards ego’, and a vertical dimension term, like ‘dow n’, is the most app rop­
riate one. If the subject is pattern-oriented , however, he cannot use ‘straight’ 
here, but must instead use ‘left’. So it should be possible to distinguish the 
same orientation types for this pattern  by the use of o ther  terms than in 
Figure 1. That is what has been done. Notice that the distinction cannot 
always be made: if the subject linearizes the loop by going the o ther  way 
round, moving first from yellow to green, it should be the move from blue to 
yellow that would distinguish ego-oriented and pattern-orien ted  direction 
terms. But often subjects use the unm arked  ‘back to yellow’ in that case. So, it 
is not always possible to distinguish the two types. Tables 3 and 4 present the 
distribution of our 34 ‘clear cases’, for Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
Both tables show highly significant consistencies among our subjects. Only 
three subjects have changed orientation type in describing Figure 3, and no 
more than two out of 34 in describing Figure 4. For completeness it should be 
rem arked  that, on the average, 25 o ther  patterns  intervened between the 
descriptions of Figure 1 and e ither of Figures 3 and 4. Figures 3 and 4 were on
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Table 3 Distribution of ego- and pattern-oriented descriptions of Figure 3 for ego-
and pattern-oriented subjects*
Description of Figure 3
Subjects Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented Indeterminable
Ego-oriented 21 1 0
Pattern-oriented 2 10 0
*Categorized on the basis of their descriptions of Figure 1.
Table 4 Distribution of ego- and pattern-oriented descriptions of Figure 4 for ego-
and pattern-oriented subjects*
Description of Figure 4
Subjects Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented Indetei minable
Ego-oriented 21 0 1
Pattern-oriented 2 9 1
^Categorized on the basis of their descriptions of Figure 1.
the average also 25 patterns apart in the series, and all o rder permutations 
were possible. We also checked separately w hether our 53 subjects were 
consistent in type between their descriptions of Figures 3 and 4. They were: 
only one subject out of 47 clear cases was pattern-orien ted  for Figure 3 and 
ego-oriented for Figure 4, all others being consistent. Finally, we did one 
more global analysis over all 53 subjects and 53 patterns. We used an indica­
tion for intrinsic orientation which can best be explained from Figure 3. If a 
subject uses the term ‘left’ for the direction from green to yellow, this can only 
be due to intrinsic orientation (or to error);  in deictic orientation this direc­
tion should be ‘right’. Let us, just for shorthand purposes, call this ‘contradic­
tory left’. Similarly, one can define ‘contradictory right’ as for instance ‘right’ 
for green to yellow in Figure 4. By m eans of a com puter  program  we sorted 
out all cases of contradictory left and contradictory right in our 53 x 53 
pattern  descriptions. We found that 33 subjects did not show a single case of 
contradictory left or right. O ne could argue that these include all ego-oriented 
subjects, bu t they may also include some pattern-oriented  (intrinsic) subjects 
since there is not a single pa ttern  where it is necessary for an intrinsic subject 
to use contradictory left or right. (In Figures 3 and 4 such a subject could, for 
instance, say ‘back to yellow’, and in so doing evade the use of ‘left’ or ‘right’.) 
But if orientation  types are consistent across patterns, a subject who uses 
contradictory left or right at least once should be intrinsic as a whole, i.e. all 
20 remaining subjects should be of the pa ttern-orien ted  type. C oun te r­
evidence against this would be if any of these subjects occurred among the 22
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‘clear’ ego-oriented cases of Table 1. This turned out to be the case for four of 
the 20 subjects (as compared to 18 for the 33 ‘non-contradictory’ subjects). It 
shows that absolute consistency does not occur, but even for this very strong 
test (the subject has 53 patterns in which to be ‘contradictory’ at least once) 
the num ber and seriousness of the deviations is small. The four deviant sub­
jects gave contradictory left or right in three cases on the average. For all 20 
subjects who showed such use of left and right the average was eight cases, 
the range from 2 to 24. A final statistical datum  for the consistency of the 
orientation types is the correlation between the use of contradictory left and 
use of contradictory right. If we correlate the num ber of cases ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
over all subjects, we find r — 0.88: a subject who tends to use contradictory 
right also tends to use contradictory left.
From all this, we may conclude that our subjects have a ra ther consistent 
style of orientation in describing spatial patterns, both within and across 
descriptions. Roughly two-thirds of the subjects are ego-oriented in their 
descriptions, using their own orientation axes as a basis for selecting direc­
tional terms. The o ther  one-third consists of subjects who are pattern- 
oriented; they use the direction of the last move they have made as an 
orientation for the direction m entioned in the next one.
The obvious question now is whether orientation type has anything to do 
with linearization type. This will be the topic of the next section.
3 L IN E A R IZ A T IO N  T Y P E  V E R SU S O R IE N T A T IO N  T Y P E
The two subjects used as examples turned out to differ in both linearization 
type and orientation type: he is an ego-oriented jum per  and she a pattern- 
oriented mover. Is it more generally the case that jum pers  tend to be ego- 
oriented and movers pattern-orien ted? Let us consider the evidence. 
R em em ber  that the descriptions of Figure 1 allowed us to find 34 ‘clear cases’ 
of orientation type. It was also noticed above that 46 out of 47 cases agreed in 
orientation type between Figures 3 and 4. So, these 46 subjects can also be 
considered as ‘clear cases’, though on a different basis. Tables 5 and 6 show 
how these clear ego- and pattern-orien ted  subjects distribute over the three 
linearization types: jum pers , movers, and mixers. Inspection of these tables 
shows that no significant differences exist in the distribution of ego- and 
pattern-orien ted  subjects over linearization types: we have no basis from 
these data for claiming that linearization and orientation  types are related.
Still, it would be surprising if the linearization strategy would affect o r ien ta­
tion at no point in the pattern  description. The reason is purely procedural. It 
was noticed in Section 1 that jum pers  presum ably store unfinished choice 
points in working memory, in o rder  to ensure correct backtracking. Movers 
need not do this, as no such storage is required  for producing complete 
descriptions. But what does it mean to ‘store a choice po in t’? Will it be stored
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Table 5 Distribution of ego- and pattern-oriented subjects over linearization
types (basis: Figure 1 descriptions, N  = 34)
Linearization type
Orientation type
Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented
Jumper 11 8
Mover 8 4
Mixer 3 0
with or without the direction that led into it? The simplest hypothesis is that 
only pattern-oriented subjects will store the direction, whereas ego-oriented 
ones will not. A  pattern-oriented  subject must always relate the subsequent 
direction from  a node to the an tecedent direction into that node, which must 
be specially registered. But what is the direction into a choice node after a 
jum p? Is it the direction from some far-away node, that happened to be the 
end of one branch from the choice node? T hat would not be a very valid 
system, since that direction can be oblique to different degrees, so that terms 
like ‘left’, ‘right’, and ‘straight’ cannot be used in a determ inate  way. It is thus 
simpler to register the original direction into the choice point, and keep it in 
working m em ory for later reference.
Ego-oriented  subjects, however, will never need such directional inform a­
tion. They base the choice of their directional terms solely on the direction 
from  a node plus their personal orientation. The direction into the node is 
simply irrelevant, and hence needs no storage in their linearization procedure.
If this hypothesis is correct, both  ego-oriented and pattern-oriented 
jum pers  will use ‘left’ or ‘right’ after jum ping back to the red choice point in 
Figure 1, but for different reasons: the ego-oriented jum pers  will label the 
next move out of red by reference to their own body, the pattern-orien ted  
jum pers  will do it by reference to the original move into the red point coming 
from grey. These two referential devices happen to coincide in this case. W hat 
about the movers? If movers d o n ’t register choice nodes, they also d o n ’t store 
the direction of the original move into the choice node. Ego-orien ted  movers
Table 6 Distribution of ego- and pattern-oriented subjects over linearization
types (basis: Figure 3 and 4 descriptions, N  = 46)
Linearization type
Orientation type
Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented
Jumper 20 7
Mover 9 6
Mixer 4 0
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will simply use their body orientation as the orientation for the next move out 
of a choice point. They will say ‘left’ or ‘right’ when they leave the red choice 
point of Figure 1 for the second time. Pattern-oriented movers will also have 
no trace of the earlier move into the choice point, so they will use the last 
return move as the basis for orientation. They will therefore not use terms like 
‘left’ and ‘right’, but ‘straight on ’ or an unm arked term like ‘and th en ’, signal­
ling unchanged continuation of direction. So, in summary: (1) all jum pers  will 
use ‘left’ or ‘right’ to describe their second move out of the red choice point;
(2) all ego-oriented movers will do the same; and (3) none of the pattern- 
oriented movers will do so. W hat we find is that indeed out of our 34 clear 
cases all of the 11 ego-oriented and eight pattern-oriented jum pers use ‘left’ 
or ‘right’; all of the eight ego-oriented movers do the same, and none of the 
four pattern-oriented movers do. (There are further three mixers, all ego- 
oriented, in the sample; they each use ‘left’ or ‘right’, as they should.) These 
numbers are too small for statistical evaluation, but at least they are in full 
correspondence with the assumptions. If this result receives further confirma­
tion, one would in general find an interaction between linearization type and 
orientation type after returns to choice nodes. But this interaction does not 
signal a correlation between two style factors; it ra ther is a necessary proces­
sing consequence given  these style factors.
It should have become clear by now that difference (iv) between our 
example subjects, his saying ‘to the right’, and her saying ‘straight o n ’ after 
returning to the red choice point, can be explained by such an interaction.
4 SEX  A N D  H A N D E D N E S S
The use of a male versus a female subject as illustrative cases may have 
created the impression that females are pattern-orien ted  movers, and males 
ego-oriented jumpers. W hether  or not this would correspond to any of the pet 
stereotypes of our culture, the simple fact is that the data  show no evidence 
for this. The 30 female and 23 male subjects of our study distribute about 
equally over the linearization types, and also over the orientation types.
The situation is som ewhat different for handedness, however. A fte r  finish­
ing the experiment, and thanks to a suggestion of John Marshall, we were able 
to recover handedness data  for 40 of our 53 subjects. These were categorized 
as ‘pure r igh t-handed’ (20 cases) or ‘d ifferent’; the latter category contained 
five left-handers, and 15 right-handers who claimed to have left-handers 
am ong their own or their pa ren ts ’ siblings.
We found no relation whatsoever between handedness and linearization 
type, but a noteworthy connection appeared  between handedness and orien­
tation type. Tables 7 and 8 show the distribution of the 33 out of 34 clear 
orientation  cases for Figure 1, and the 34 out of 46 clear cases for Figures 3 
and 4 for whom we had handedess information.
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Table 7 Handedness versus orientation type in Figure 1 descriptions
Orientation-type
Handedness Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented
Pure right-handers 11 5
^ .rc  * i Left-handers iJirterent (  ^  ^ , 2 2\ Left-handed siblings 5 8
Table 8 Handedness versus orientation-type in Figure 3 and 4 descriptions
Orientation-type
Handedness Ego-oriented Pattern-oriented
Pure right-handers 14 4
4 ( Left-handers Jirterent ( ^ 2 1l Left-handed siblings 6 7
Fischer tests for ‘pure r igh t-handed’ versus ‘different’ showed marginal 
significances: p  =  0.08 for Table 7, and p  =  0.07 for Table 8. On the basis of 
these data we should consider the interesting possibility that pure right­
handers take a predom inantly  deictic perspective, i.e. use their own orienta­
tion as a basis for the use of deictical terms, whereas genotypic left-handers 
(w hether phenotypic or not) are less inclined to do so: they easily take an 
intrinsic perspective, using the p a t te rn ’s orientation for the selection of their 
directional terms. This may be an indication of their more general approach 
to spatial orientations in language use.
In conclusion, then, we have reported  strong evidence that systematic indi­
vidual differences exist in the use of deictical terms, which are not so much 
due to superficial variations in idiolect, but ra ther  to differences in the ways 
people opera te  on spatial information. There  is, moreover, some indication 
that these differences may be in part genetically determ ined.
N O T E
1. One could argue that what we call intrinsic orientation in the present task is in 
actuality also deictic: it is ego who makes the tour, and at any moment it is the 
orientation of ego which determines what is straight, left, and right. If, for Figure 1, 
ego moves from yellow to red, then grey is left of red. If, however, ego moves from 
pink to red, then grey is right of red. If both are possible, the direction could hardly be 
called intrinsic to the pattern. Though we agree that the latter is true, we feel that this 
is at most a difference in degree with more common examples of intrinsic orientation. 
If a lampshade is said to be ( ‘intrinsically’) to the right side of a chair this is only so
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because ego has a preferred orientation with respect to the chair. The ambiguous 
orientation in the above example of Figure 1 is matched by a ‘classical’ intrinsic case of 
a couch. If a flat couch is in the middle of a room, it does have intrinsic orientation, but 
an ambiguous one: a lampshade is right or left of the couch dependent on how ego 
‘takes place’ on the couch. Intrinsic orientation can be ambiguous in this way because 
it depends crucially on the interpretation of the pattern. Only deictic orientation is 
always unambiguous because it does not depend on such interpretation.
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